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                                                 ABSTRACT
In recent years, it may be observed a revisionist process focused on logical positivism, particularly on Carnap’s work. One aspect of this revisionism is the thesis that Carnap’s later thought is compatible with that of Kuhn and even that Carnap anticipates some relevant points of Kuhn’s theory of science. In this paper I argue against revisionist’s interpretation to the fact of publication of Kuhn’s The Structure o Scientific Revolutions in the Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, as evidence of the compatibility between Carnap’s and Kuhn’s respective philosophies of science. I claim that from Carnap’s point of view the book by Kuhn is not in philosophy of science, but rather in history of science, and so that there is no justification for the revisionist idea that Carnap would “have found Structure philosophically congenial”. I support my criticism in the fact that Carnap never refers to Kuhn in his work.

A historical revisionist process of logical positivism is in progress, characterized by a conscious effort to re-evaluate the work of its main representatives, particularly Carnap, as opposed to what is considered a caricatural reading already crystallized in tradition. There is one clearly positive aspect here, namely, the willingness to take into account historical circumstances when investigating a philosophical movement. And also the extension of these benefits to the very same movement that, in general, attributed little importance to history. 
The most recent motivation for this work appears to be the access to the new documentation provided by the ‘Unity of Science Movement Papers’ of the Pittsburgh University, in which two letters sent by the associate editor Carnap to the author Kuhn have been found, concerning the author’s publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. The very fact that such a book has been published in that particular forum, given the critical character of Kuhn’s work on logical positivism, has caused surprise and reasonable excitement to historians confronted with what could be referred to as the remains of a Trojan Horse.
To the supporters of revisionism, however, such a problem is easily solved, for there is nothing absurd after all in the fact that Kuhn has received institutional acceptance by logical positivism through his own publications, neither in the fact that he has received Carnap’s professional and personal support. According to revisionists, this contradiction is merely apparent and can easily be explained. To them, it is a consequence of a misinterpretation of logical positivism, which is seen, especially from the post-positivism point of view, in a manner in which the two movements would oppose one another in contrast, black on white, much like a piece of philosophical advertising. 
George Reisch writes:

On the basis of his {Carnap} published writings and two unpublished letters sent to Kuhn, I will show that Carnap did not see The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as a challenge to his own philosophical views, and further that it should not be seen as such​[1]​. If Kuhn debunked certain tenets of logical empiricism (namely, a theory/observation distinction and paradigm-independent criteria of theory goodness) partly by suggesting that they were impotent to capture the reasoning involved in episodes of revolutionary scientific change, the fact remains that these tenets do not ground Carnap’s view of revolutionary scientific reasoning. In choices between radically different theories, different conceptual frameworks, or (in his preferred philosophical idiom) different languages, he offers an account that is in fact distinctly analogous to that of Kuhn. The following discussion of these points should give pause to those generalizing that Kuhn “did in” logical empiricism (REISCH 1991, p 265). 

Other revisionists in support of their thesis cite this interpretation of the publication of Structure in Encyclopedia​[2]​. According to John Earman, 

Given these Kuhnian themes {“the nonexistence of neutral facts and incommensurability in the form of failure of intertranslatability”} or should we rather say Carnapian themes?  one might predict that Carnap would have found Structure philosophically congenial. That this was indeed the case has been documented by Reisch (1991) (EARMAN 1993, p. 11). 

In the following pages, I present some critiques of the Carnap-Kuhn relationship as interpreted by revisionists. They are concerned specifically with the publication of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by positivists in their International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. This fact with the sympathetic letters addressed by the co-editor Carnap to Kuhn have been interpreted  erroneously, as I shall argue  as evidence of the close compatibility between the two authors respective philosophies of science. I fully agree with Reisch’s assertion that “Carnap did not see The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as a challenge to his own philosophical views”, but for quite different reasons. Prudently, I shall not include among these reasons Reisch’s emphatic complement according to which, further, “it should not be seen as such” (REISCH 1991, p. 265, quoted above).


Revisionists seem to be too hasty in drawing their conclusions from the appreciative letters from Carnap to Kuhn. These two letters are far too brief.  Excluding purely editorial details, they may be summarized as follows:

Letter 1 (12 April 1960):
I believe that the planned monograph will be a valuable contri​bution to the Encyclopedia. I am myself very much interested in the problems which you intend to deal with, even though my knowledge of the history of science is rather fragmentary. Among many other items I liked your emphasis on the new conceptual frameworks which are proposed in revolutions in science, and, on their basis, the posing of new questions, not only answers to old problems (REISCH 1991, p. 266).

Letter 2 (28 April 1962):
I am convinced that your ideas will be very stimulating for all those who are interested in the nature of scientific theories and especially the causes and forms of their changes. I found very illuminating the parallel you draw with Darwinian evolution: just as Darwin gave up the earlier idea that the evolution was directed towards a predeter​mined goal, men as the perfect organism, and saw it as a process of improvement by natural selection, you emphasize that the develop​ment of theories is not directed toward the perfect true theory, but is a process of improvement of an instrument. In my own work on in​ductive logic in recent years I have come to a similar idea: that my work and that of a few friends in the step for step solution of prob​lems should not be regarded as leading to “the ideal system”, but rather as a step for step improvement of an instrument. Before I read your manuscript I would not have put it in just those words. But your formulations and clarifications by examples and also your analogy with Darwin’s theory helped me to see clearer what I had in mind. From September on I shall be for a year at the Stanford Center. I hope that we shall have an opportunity to get together and talk about problems of common interest (REISCH 1991, pp.266-267).

According to Reisch, one can eliminate the perplexity caused by the reading of these letters  letters which would justify the warm reception given by the “archon of logical empiricism” towards the theory that was destined “to kill” logical empiricism (Cf. REISCH 1991, p.276)  if one takes into account Carnap’s later work. He presents some of Carnap’s texts, which appear to be compatible with both the content of the letters and Kuhn’s postulations. Many other revisionists seek to do the same. Therefore, there are those, such as Earman, who talk about relativism, semantic holism, and even about the selection of paradigms and the concept of incommensurability in Carnap (Cf. EARMAN 1993, pp.11, 12, 21).
A general problem of these approaches is the difficulty they have in identifying explicit texts by Carnap, for example, on scientific revolutions. There is a small number of such texts and, in some cases, they are subsequent to Carnap’s contact with Kuhn, which, as Reisch recognizes, could risk the necessary fairness and the independence needed to draw a parallel between these authors. They, then, resort to “Carnap’s larger corpus” (REISCH 1991, p.270, note 4), essentially to the language studies, in order to carry out a comparative analysis. It seems to me that making use of such resources is not totally improper, bearing in mind their intention is only to demonstrate the compatibility between the works. However, my point is, as we will see below, that it disguises an important theoretical and historical aspect, namely, that Carnap is not referring to the scientific revolution, and, therefore, what he says should not be taken inadvertently as “his views on revolutionary scientific thinking” (REISCH 1991, p.270).
What I wish to point out preliminarily is that this feature of the philosophy of science, known as the dynamic of science (Cf. KUHN 1977, pp.12, 267 and HORWICH 1993, pp.312-313), is not a Carnapian theme. As Hempel writes: 
 
the analytic empiricist school was not much concerned with the analysis of theoretical change; Popper was a notable exception. The main concern of other members of the group was with such topics as induction, confirmation, probability, explanation, concept formation and the structure and function of theories” (HEMPEL 2001, p.365). 

This seems to be quite clear in Carnap’s last book, dedicated to the philosophy of science: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (1966). It deals with very few references either related to themes such as scientific revolution, theory choice or  progress, as can be quickly verified by checking its index. Besides, Kuhn is not mentioned, even when these themes are referred to; his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions does not appear in the bibliography neither in the “general books” section, where titles by authors such as Scheffler and Hempel, both published after 1962 (in 1963 and 1965, respectively), are listed. This seems odd. Were the revisionists’ interpretation to be accurate, would one not expect at least one mention of Kuhn? And even a frequent quotation given (1) the supposed close relation between “Carnap’s larger corpus” and Kuhn’s ideas about science and (2) the fundamental importance of science in “Carnap’s larger corpus”?
 On the other hand, could this discrepancy, by any chance be dispelled, either by reasoning that Carnap’s last book is only an introductory book or that Martin Gardner has edited it from 1958 class notes? 
The book has its preface signed by Carnap, in which he states he has followed Gardner’s work closely and that he has even made major alterations and suggested changes. Gardner, in turn, in his preface to the 1974 edition states that he has preserved the bibliography defined by Carnap in 1966. The introductory nature of the book should be questioned owing to the fact that it originally had the more pompous title “Philosophical Foundations of Physics”, chosen by Carnap (Cf. CARNAP 1995, p.vii).
One could claim, against my interpretation, that the fact that Carnap fails to mention Kuhn in his book stems from the fact that he published it in 1966 but with the contents of the lectures delivered in 1958-1959 at the University of California. This would mean that the An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science does not adequately show that Carnap gives no importance to Kuhn in his work because the book was actually written in the years 58-59, hence before the publication of Structure. Nevertheless, such an objection would be useful to show that Carnap’s philosophy of science, a few years before Structure  in its “mature” stage anyway  was indeed hardly related to Kuhn's work. It is evident that Carnap could not refer to Kuhn in his book, not only owing to chronological impossibility but also to the fact that his work, from a philosophical point of view, does not really concern Kuhn.
Therefore, the negligence of the alleged ‘Kuhnian’ Carnap towards Kuhn might not be understood by the special characteristics of that particular work by Carnap. Neither by the relative absence of the so called ‘dynamics’ themes in Carnap’s philosophy of science, since there are some references to these themes in the book and no references at all to Kuhn. Moreover, Kuhn is never mentioned in any Carnap’s work.
In fact, is it possible that Carnap excluded Kuhn from his work on philosophy of science because he does not consider Kuhn’s work to be philosophy of science? Could it be considered as, perhaps, sociology of science, psychology of science or  to use the unique term Carnap has employed to refer to Kuhn’s work in the letters  history of science? Or, in a word, could it be anything outside the so-called “context of justification”? If so, an appropriate alternative would have been found in order to explain the acceptance, seen as anomalous, of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions being published in the Encyclopedia of Unified Science.
Let us see what Carnap says in the opening of his article Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science: 

The task of analyzing science may be approached from various angles (...) We may, for instance, think of an in​vestigation of scientific activity. We may study the historical development of this activity. Or we may try to find out in which way scientific work depends upon the individual condi​tions of the men working in science, and upon the status of the society surrounding them. Or we may describe procedures and appliances used in scientific work. These investigations of scientific activity may be called history, psychology, sociology, and methodology of science. The subject matter of such studies is science as a body of actions carried out by certain persons under certain circumstances. Theory of science in this sense will be dealt with at various other places in this Encyclopedia; it is certainly an essential part of the foundation of science. (...) But it is possible to abstract in an analysis of the statements of science from the persons asserting the statements and from the psychological and sociological conditions of such assertions. The analysis of the linguistic expressions of science under such an abstraction is logic of science. (CARNAP 1938, pp.42-43).

The “logic of science” in this sense was conceived in order to replace philosophy of science and ultimately philosophy, as is evident in texts such as On the Character of Philosophic Problems (1934), whose first section is named unequivocally “philosophy is the logic of science” (p. 5). As Hempel comments: 

Carnap held that in calling for a logical linkage between scientific hypotheses and experimental evidence, analytic meant to offer a requirement, a prescription, a norm for a meaningful empirical discourse, not the descriptive assertion that the claims advanced by scientists are actually always properly linked to experiential findings. Carnap and Popper (but not Neurath, as will be seen below) were emphatic in rejecting such a “naturalistic” view. Accordingly, they held it to be strictly irrelevant for the logical analysis of science to study the biological, psychological, and sociological factors that can affect scientific inquiry as a concrete human activity (HEMPEL 2000, pp. 300-301).

And he continues, in order to stress the secondary character of the “naturalistic” approach to science:

There was, to be sure, a polite bow in the direction of a pragmatic study of the psychological, historical, political, and social facets of actual scientific research behavior: such study might shed light on the ways in which that behavior deviates from analytic-empiricist standards (HEMPEL 2000, p. 301).

I think there are no reasons to believe that Carnap had abandoned this perspective later, particularly in the light of his efforts to developing a project of an inductive logic. About “explication”, conceived and used by Carnap in Logical Foundations of Probability (1950),  Hempel adds:

Explication plays an important role in analytic philosophy, where it has often been referred to as logical analysis or as rational reconstruction. All the accounts proposed by analytic empiricists for such notions as verification, falsification, confirmation, inductive reasoning, types of explanation theoretical reduction, and the like are instances of explication, i.e., they propose explicit and precise reconstructions of vague concepts that play an important role in philosophical theories of knowledge (HEMPEL 2001, p.379).

Thus, the publication of Structure in the Encyclopedia could be justified merely by the fact that the Encyclopedia project had already reserved space for it. By the way, it is worth pointing out that, as we know, the editors commissioned Kuhn’s book especially for publication in the Encyclopedia (Cf., for example, MERTON 1977). Admitting Carnap’s classification of that work as either history of science, psychology, sociology, methodology of science or, perhaps, all these subjects at the same time (which incidentally one could very well describe Kuhn’s work by Carnap’s terms) would be the natural way, I believe, by which not just one, but two difficulties could be solved: the publication of Structure in the Encyclopedia and the ‘Kuhnian Carnap’s’ complete indifference towards Kuhn in all his work, particularly in his last book, dedicated exactly to the philosophy of science and published long after the two praising letters had been sent. 
There is evidence in the Encyclopedia supporting the fact that logical positivists saw Structure as a work in history of science. In “Bibliography and Index”, published as the final piece in vol.II of the Encyclopedia in 1970, Feigl and Morris classify Structure under the title “History of Science” instead of other titles such as “Foundations of Physics”, “Theory of Knowledge” and even “General Philosophy of Science”. In addiction, it should be noted that the authors thank “Professor Carnap” for his “suggestions for the improvement of an earlier version of the bibliography” (FEIGL & MORRIS 1970, p.949). 
It is worthwhile emphasizing here that the ‘historicist turn’ in the philosophy of science, with its rejection of discovery-justification dualism, was one of the most prominent consequences of Kuhn’s book. But this was the outcome of a relatively long historical process. Only after the change of meaning of the term ‘philosophy of science’ was Kuhn himself considered a philosopher of science. It is known that he was President of the History of Science Society in 1968-1970, but President of the Philosophy of Science Association only in 1988-1990 (and in the latter case, he had “not even been a member of the Association”) (KUHN 2000, p. 311. See also BUCHWALD 1997, p. 361). So it is natural for Carnap to have taken Kuhn’s book as a history of science work. In a historical sense, one could accept Reisch’s claim stating that Carnap should not see Structure as a philosophical challenge.
Still in the year 1961, Feigl argues in favor of an outlook that we could call ‘the weak programme in the history of science’:

I do not for a moment deny the psychological, social, economic or political factors that have on many occasions had a powerful influence upon the thinking of scientists. But to become aware of these distorting influences is already the first step toward their successful elimination (FEIGL 1961, p. 15).

Thus, from Carnap’s point of view, the compatibility (or non-incompatibility) revealed by letters would not be between the two philosophies of science, but indeed a trivial compatibility (or non-incompatibility) between his logic of science, with its sheer citizenship in the context of justification, and Kuhn’s history of science, segregated in the context of discovery. So, it would not be justified to say, as Earman does, that Carnap would have found Structure “philosophically congenial” and that Reisch would have “documented” it (EARMAN 1993, p.11). 
Concerning the relation between Kuhn’s theory and logical positivism, it may be worth remembering that Popper also published his first and main epistemological book, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (the first German edition), in a collection edited by logical positivists​[3]​. It was published in 1935, when Popper was not so well known, while logical positivism was in its heyday, and this certainly has contributed to the fact that Popper has been seen as a logical positivist. However, in the year of 1962, when logical positivism was already viewed as a decadent (or a decayed) movement, it published Kuhn’s work in the Encyclopedia of Unified Science. And, then, something very different happened: Kuhn was not considered a positivist, and, what is more, Carnap is now considered a precursor of postpositivism or a genuine postpositivist by the revisionists. From a historical point of view, this simple case of asymmetry is, perhaps, more than merely anecdotal.
However, despite the difficulties, the hasty revisionist interpretation is already accepted as legal currency. For instance, Professor Salmon, as a ‘passive revisionist’ (in the sense that he could be taken as a reference of the good reception of revisionism), asks himself, in a recent article, whether Kuhn had killed off logical empiricism (Reisch’s question) and then states emphatically:

 The answer is unambiguously negative, as George A. Reisch (1991) has pointed out. Kuhn’s work was, after all, first published in The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, a compendium that was to encapsulate logical positivism and logical empiricism results (SALMON 1999, p.347).

To conclude: 
I have sought to show that the correspondence from Carnap to Kuhn appears to have been interpreted in a precipitated and equivocal way by revisionists. According to them, the welcome reception of Kuhn’s book would have resulted from the fact that Carnap considered it “philosophically congenial” (Cf. EARMAN 1993, p.11). This explanation, although plausible at first sight, does not resist further analysis. Against this is the strange fact that Carnap has never made a reference to Kuhn in his work, even to Structure, which was after all published in his Encyclopedia. Indeed, Carnap certainly considered it as a (nice) work in the history of science, to which, as such, the Encyclopedia had already reserved space in advance. 
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^1	  In all quotations in this paper, the bold fonts are mine.
^2	  See, for example, AXTELL 1993, EARMAN 1993, IRZIK & GRUNBERG 1995 and FRIEDMAN 1998.
^3	  Schriften zur Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, under the direction of Schlick and Philipp Frank (Cf. CARNAP 1937, p. 281).
